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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BUEHNER BLOCK COMPANY, a corpor- , 
ation, and SOUTH STATE BUILDERS 
SUPPLY COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
NICK GLEZOS, HARRY H 0 N G, Case No. 8591 
CHARLES C. McDERMOND, COP A 
SUPPER CLUB, a corporation, and VAL-
LEY AMUSEMENT ENTERPRISES, 
IN CORPORA TED, a corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because it appears to the plaintiffs and respondents that 
the appellant has failed to accurately state the facts (rather he 
has presenetd arguments from page 1 to page 59 inclusive), 
and has misstated some material facts, and because he has re-
cited from documents which are beyond the record in this case, 
the respondents desire to restate the facts involved in this 
particular appeal. 
... 
.) 
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During the year 1954, the defendant, Nick Glezos, and 
Katina Glezos, his wife, owned a piece of improved real estate 
at approximately 3 793 on South State Street in Salt Lake City 
(R. 70), and at that time had leased the premises for a period 
of six years to defendant and appellant, Harry Hong (Ex. 5) 
(R. 49) . This lease covered the property referred to through-
out the record and involved in this particular law suit. At the 
time of the execution of the lease, and preceding the summer of 
1954, defendant, Harry Hong, maintained a restaurant on the 
premises which was commonly known as the Golden Pheasant 
Restaurant (R. 49). At some date during 1954, the defendant, 
C. C. McDermond, and the defendant, Hary Hong, as part12ers, 
commenced the construction of an addition to the building 
then located upon the premises, by adding a room in back to 
be used as a private club (R. 50, 57, 70, 71, 72, 80, 81, 82, 
91 and 92) . At the time of the commencement of the addition 
to the property, defendant, Harry Hong, was then paying the 
sum of $2 50.00 per month rental (R. 51). Subsequent to the 
completion of the building, defendant, Nick Glezos, terminated 
the lease \Yith defendant, Hong, (Ex. 6) and entered into a 
month to month lease with Hong, leasing the old portion of 
the building alone at only $125.00 per month (R. 51, 62). 
The plaintiff. Buehner Block Company, furnished the blocks 
for the construction of the rear portion of the building during 
the period of July and August, 1954. All of these blocks were 
ordered by defendant. C. C. McDern1ond, and it \YJS stipulated 
that they \\·ere received and installed into the building referred 
to iu this litigation, the reasonable value being fixed at the 
sutn nf $605.51 (R. 47, Ex. 1). Plaintiff, South State Builders 
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Supply Company, delivered materials which, it was stipulated, 
\Vere installed and used in connection with the construction 
of said building during the period of October and November, 
1954, and the sum of $394.87 was a reasonable and fair figure 
for the value of the materials furnished (R. 48, Ex. 3). Though 
South State Builders Supply Company's invoices are shown as 
billed to Spencer VanNoy, most of them are signed by de-
fendant, McDermond, (Ex. 3), and it was stipulated, and the 
invoices so show, that they were furnished and used in con-
nectoin with the construction by McDermond upon the premises 
leased by defendant, Hong, (R. 48). At the time the materials 
were ordered, there was some concern by the plaintiff, Buehner 
Block Company, as to exactly who was ordering the materials, 
and although they could do no more than to identify Mr. 
McDermond at that particular time, they knew the materials 
. were being used for the Golden Pheasant Cafe addition (Ex. 
1, R. 84-86). 
Immediately following the construction of the back room, 
r defendant, Hong, was receiving $250.00 per month income on 
r: 
the back room alone (R. 63). Thus, Hong obtained the front 
)~ 
portion, which he operated as a restaurant, without any addi-
tional cost to himself, since the lease of the whole building 
J~ called for only $250.00 per month. Plaintiffs thereafter at-
tempted numerous times to collect their accounts from the I~ 
operators of the property and were unable to do so. Each 
~~:~: 
plaintiff thereafter filed a notice of lien to protect his rights 
~~~ (Ex. 2, 4), and on June 13, 1955, plaintiff, Buehner Block 
~: 
Cotnpany, filed its complaint in this case (R. 1) setting forth 
~~ 
two causes of action. The first cause of action is a plea to 
~[~~ 
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hold the property liable for the improvements placed thereon, 
and seeks a lien foreclosure. The second cause of action seeks 
to hold the defendants, and each of them, liable for the items 
sold and delivered to the property, and the reasonable value 
therefor. Default judgments were taken by Buehner Block 
Company against Charles C. McDermond, Copa Supper Club 
and the Valley Amusement Enterprises, Incorporated. The 
articles of incorporation of these defendants were neither 
offered nor received in evidence. 
On November 3, 1955, plaintiff, South State Builders Supply 
Company, filed a complaint substantially the same as Buehner 
Block Company's, and filed a motion to join the two causes 
in one proceeding (R. 17-21). Defendants, Copa Supper Club 
and Valley Amusement Enterprises, were served with summons, 
though defendant, McDermond, was unserved, though 
summons was issued (R. 24). Trial was held before the 
Honorable Ray VanCott, Jr., a judge of the Third Judical 
District Court, as a result of which judgment was entered 
against defendant, Harry Hong, and herein appealed upon, and 
a dismissal \Vas entered in favor of defendant, Nick Glezos. 
Since there is no appeal taken from the dismissal, that matter 
\vill not be referred to hereafter. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
For convenience, the argun1ents of appellant and defendant, 
Harry Hnng, \\'ill be anS\Yered under the following headings: 
1. 'l'llE COl\lPLAINTS STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION 
At~AINST l)EFENDANT, HARRI'" HONG. 
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II. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, COM-
PETENT EVIDENCE. 
III. THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMITTED BY THE 
COURT IN THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL. 
IV. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT HONG'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COMPLAINTS STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION 
AGAINST DEFENDANT, HARRY HONG. 
The complaints of each of the plaintiffs herein are similar 
in nature and therefore will be discussed as though there was 
only one complaint filed. It should be noted, however, that at 
no time did defendant, Hong, raise this defense as to the com-
plaint of South State Builders Supply Company. Each com-
plaint sets forth two causes of action. 
(a) The first cause of action was drafted as a lien fore-
closure against the defendant, Nick Glezos, and alleges that the 
defendants, Harry Hong and others, claim some interest in the 
property, which interest is subservient to the lien of plaintiffs. 
This cause of action is well pleaded under our statute relating 
to the foreclosure of mechanic's lien. U.C.A. 38-1-7 (1953) 
requires that a notice of claim be recorded setting forth the 
narr1e of the owner, if known, together with the name of the 
person the material was furnished to, and the terms of the 
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contract, specifying the time when the first and last materials 
were furnished, and a description of the property sufficient 
to charge it with a lien, and also setting forth the statement of 
the demand, all of which had been compiled with, as is evi-
denced by the notices of lien, known as Exhibits 2 and 4, filed 
in the record. An action for a lien foreclosure is in the nature 
of an equitable action. This court has ruled on the question 
of the parties to a lien foreclosure proceeding and whether or 
not one who claims some right, title or interest in or to the 
property is a necessary party. In so ruling the court held: 
'' ... it is argued that the appellant is not a proper 
party to this action. It may well be doubted whether 
that objection can be raised by a general demurrer. 
Waiving that point, however, we have already held that 
under our statute any person who claims a mortgage 
or other lien on premises on which mechanics' liens 
are sought to be foreclosed in an action in equity may 
be made a party, and his right to claim a lien on the 
premises in question may be litigated in such an action. 
Cain v. Parfitt, 158 Pac. 448. We see no reason to 
change or modify our ruling in that regard. The com-
plaint was not vulnerable to the demurrer for the 
reason that appellant's claim to or interest in the prop-
erty in question was not more specifically stated. 
Enough was stated in the complaint to authorize the 
company to make appellant a party to the action. The 
court therefore, did not err in overruling the demurrer." 
Badget· Coal. and Lut1lbe,- z·. Olson~ 50 Utah 307, 167 
Pac. 680-681. 
It is therefore obvious that the first cause of action pleaded 
by the plaintiffs in their con1plaint does state a cause of action 
~tgainst the defcnd~tnt, I-Iarry Hong. 
(b) It is further alleged in plaintiffs' first cause of action 
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that the plaintiffs have a lien against whatever interest any 
of the defendants claim in and to the property for which the 
materials were furnished. Thus, it is alleged that the plaintiffs 
claim a lien against the leasehold estate of Harry Hong, and 
any of the other defendants. Our statute provides ( U.C.A. 
38-1-3, (1953]): 
((Such liens shall attach only to such interest as the 
owner may have in the property, but the interest of the 
lessee of a mining claim, mine or deposit, whether 
working under bond or otherwise, shall for the purpose 
of this chapter include products mined and excavated 
and the same remain upon the premises included within 
the lease." 
The fact that the statute refers to the lien as attaching to the 
interest of the ((owner" does not preclude the same lien from 
attaching to a leasehold estate. ((Owner'' has been defined by 
this court as including a person with an equitable interest. See 
Garland v. Bear Lake and River Water W arks and Irrigation 
Company, 9 Utah 350, 34 Pac. 368. (Affirmed 164 U.S. 1, 
41 L. Ed. 327, 17 S. Ct. 7); Cary-Lombard Lumber Company 
v. Partridge, 10 Utah 322, 37 Pac. 572. In the case of Ellis v. 
Porter, 8 Utah 108, 29 Pac. 879, this court held that a mechanic's 
lien may attach against a leasehold estate, and is not lost by 
the purchase of such estate by the lessor, when the lessor has 
knowledge of the improvements for which the lien is claimed. 
The cases are numerous in which the courts hav:e held that a 
mechanic(s lien may attach to a leasehold interest for supplying 
labor or materials for the construction, repair or improvements 
of buildings or other similar structures. See Annotation 42 
A.L.R. 2d 687, Note I. ((Owner" in our statute should not be 
limited to the owner of the fee only, but also include the 
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owner of the leasehold estate. See National Gas Company v. 
Ada and Metal Company, 185 Okla. 415, 93 P. 2d 529; 
Benjamin v. Wilson, 34 ·Minn. 517, 26 N.W. 725; Choteau 
v. Thompson, 2 Ohio St. 114. 
(c) As to plaintiffs' second cause of action, defendants 
are claimed liable for the reasonable value of materials fur-
nished to defendants, and each of them, with their knowledge, 
consent and approval, and to their benefit. The benefit to the 
defendant, Hong, is quite obvious. Mter the back room portion 
of the building was completed, and defendant, McDermond, 
and the partnership were operating same, defendant, Hong, was 
paid $250.00 per month for the back space alone, which was 
the total rental sum that Hong was required to pay to Glezos 
for the entire property (R. 63) , leaving Hong the former 
restaurant portion to operate as he chose, free of rental obli-
gation. Thus, it seems obvious that a cause of action is stated 
against Harry Hong in the second cause of action. 
"The doctrine of unjust enrichment for recovery in 
quasi contract applies to situations \\'here there is no 
legal contract but where the person sought to be charged 
is in possession of money or property which in good 
conscience and justice he should not retain, but should 
deliver to another, the court imposing a duty to refund 
the money or the use value of the property to the 
person to 'vhom in good conscience it ought to belong." 
Atltt~rt?Je t-'. Afoore-t,fcCort1la~:k Lines (C.C.A. 2d 
N.Y.) 158 F. 2d 6_11. 170 A.L.R. 440; 46 Am. fur. 
Rc.rtitutio11 a11d UnjuJt Enricht11ent. 1956, Supp. p. 10. 
It has been further said: "\\'here one stands by in silence 
and sees \\·ork done in the improvement of his premises, of 
10 
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which he accepts the benefit, a promise to pay therefor may 
be implied." 17 C.J.S. 321, Contracts, Sec. 4 (c). 
The matters alleged in the complaint state a claim upon 
v1hich relief can be granted and the court did not err in refusing 
to dismiss the complaint upon this ground. Moore's Federal 
Practice, Vol. 2, p. 2245, says: 
rr ••• a complaint should not be dismissed for in-
sufficiency unless it appears to a certainty that the plain-
tiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts 
which could be proved in support of tbe claim. Plead-
ings are to be liberally construed." 
(d) At this point let us discuss and answer the defendant, 
l-Iong, on the question of partnership being raised at the trial 
and not in the pleadings. The issue of partnership may 
be implied in the pleadings wherein it is alleged that all of the 
defendants are obligated to the plaintiffs. Even assuming that 
the pleadings do not allege partnership expressly, the issue can 
still be tried where there is no objection to the introduction 
of such evidence, and that is the case in this particular instance, 
including the introduction by appellant himself of testimony 
as to the existence or non-existence of a partnership (R. 93-94). 
Rule 15 (b) U.R.C.P. provides: 
~~When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried 
by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in 
the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as 
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evi-
dence and to raise these issues rna y be made upon 
motion of any party at any time even after judgrrtent; 
but failure so to amend does not affect the results of 
the trial of the issues. If evidence is objected tp at the 
11 
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trial on the ground that it is not within the issue made 
by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings 
to be amended when the presentation of the merits 
of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting 
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence wourd prejudice him in maintaining his 
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall 
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the object-
ing party to meet such evidence." 
Professor Moore in his work entitled Moore's Federal 
Practice, Vol. 3, discusses Rule 15 (b) and has the following 
to say about this Rule: 
"Rule 15 does three things. First, it facilitates amend-
ments and the presentation of supplemental matter. 
Second, it adopts the comprehensive and practical con-
cept of cause of action heretofore discussed by the 
adoption of the relation back doctrine, and coorela-
tively, it applies the doctrine to the statement of de-
fense. Third, it recognizes that at the trial stage, plead-
ings should not be over-emphasized." Page 804). 
HThe rule is not novel. It is based upon the better 
federal practice at law and in equity, which prevailed 
prior to the Federal Rules. It is, however, a clear state-
ment of what constitutes good practice. It is not pro-
hibitive of anything \vhich was before its adoption 
permissible in the ufederal courts in the direction of 
reaching desirable results." (Page 805). 
"Rule 15 (b) can be separated into two parts. First, 
if issues are tried with the express or implied consent 
of the parties, 'they shall be treated in all respects as 
if they had been raised in the pleadings.' Some state 
c:ourts, strongly imbued \Vith the necessity of correct 
\vritten pleadings, have felt that issues outside the 
plcadin~~s could not be tried even \vith express consent. 
But the doctrine that the 'cause of action' may be 
changed by the introduction of evidence \Yithout ob· 
1 ~ 
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jection was followed in the federal courts before the 
adoption of the Federal Rules; in effect, many cases 
at law broadened the definition of cause of action so 
that it included any legal rights arising from the occur-
rence set forth in the complaint. Rule 15 (b) does not 
even limit the amendment to the transaction or occur-
rence set forth in the pleadings; the only apparent 
limitation on the parties is that the court have juris-
diction over the matter tried, although as a matter of 
practice issues tried by implied or express consent 
ordinarily do arise from the same general set of facts 
set forth in the complaint. Thus a plaintiff may sue 
on one contract and recover on another; rna y sue on 
the theory of respondent superior and recover on the 
theory of the vicarious liability of an employer of an 
independent contractor; or may sue for patent infringe-
ment and also recover for unfair competition. The fact 
that this involves a change in the nature of the cause 
of action, or the legal theory of the action, is im-
material so long as the opposing party has not been 
prejudiced in presenting his case." (Page 843.) 
((While an amendment to conform to evidence may 
be made at any time on motion of any party, even in 
the appellate court, the lack of an amendment does not 
affect the judgment in any way. In effect, therefore, the 
parties may, by express consent, or by the introduction 
of evidence without objection, amend the pleadings at 
will." (Page 846). 
We feel this sufficiently explains and adequately answers 
the raising of the issue of partnership at the trial. 
POINT II. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBST ANTTAL, COMPE-
TENT EVIDENCE. 
13 
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It is the contention of plaintiffs that the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law are supported by substantial com-
petent evidence, which evidence gives rise to five separate 
conclusions of liability with respect to the defendant, Harry 
l-Ion g. Those five conclusions are as follows: 
1. A mechanic's lien foreclosure. 
2. An express contract between plaintiffs and the defe~d­
ant, Charles C. McDermond, and liability for the performance 
of said contract upon defendant, Harry Hong, by reason of 
the partnership existing between McDermond and Hong and 
others. 
3. A contract implied in fact between Plaintiffs and de-
fendant, Charles C. McRermond, and liability upon defendant, 
Harry Hong, by reason of the partnership as above set forth. 
4. Liability by contract implied in law with respect to 
defendant, Charles C. McDermond, and liability upon defend,-· 
ant, Hong, by reason of the partnership above set forth. 
5. Liability with respect to defendant, Hong, by reason of 
contract implied in law. 
All five of the above conclusions are supported by sub-
stantial con1petent evidence. All five of the above conclusions 
are supported by Findings of Fact. A sumn1ation of the evi-
'"Jence sho\vS that 01arles C. ~IcDermond \Yas the admitted 
builder of a building upon the pren1ises located at 3 793 South 
State Street in Salt Lake City. (R. 50, 57). Defendant Harry 
1 Ion,!;, \\'~Is the stipulated lessee of said pretnises for a period 
nf six )'L'~trs (R. ·l9, Ex. 5). Plaintiffs duly and properly filed 
14 
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notices of mechanic's lien. (Ex. 2 & 4) . Defendant, McDermond, 
ordered, or caused to be ordered, the materials supplied by 
plaintiffs. (R. 50, 84-86, Ex. 3 & 4). Defendant, Hong, was 
the partner of defendant, McDermond, in the construction and 
operation of the building by reason of (a) his own testimony 
and his admission to defendant Glezos that he intended to 
become a partner (R. 59, 71, 72); (b) his admission to witness 
Watson that he was a partner ( R. 81) ; (c) his admission to 
witness Watson that he had agreed to pay the debts of the 
project (R. 80) ; (d) his payment in fact of a partnership debt 
(R. 92) ; and (e) the very circumstances of the project whereby 
his restaurant was disrupted and enlarged and improved for 
the benefit of the partnership (R. 63, 67, 68). The benefit to 
the premises was made with the knowledge, consent, and ap-
proval (implied or in fact) of defendant, Hong, by which said 
benefit he has been enriched (R. 50, 51, 52). 
1. The filing of mechanic's liens by plaintiffs, and the 
actions to foreclose same within the time prescribed by law 
are all supported by the record (Ex. 2 & 4). The right of a 
lien claimant to foreclose a lien with respect to a leasehold 
interest is fully discussed in Point I (a) and (b) above. See 
Garland v. Bear Lake and River Waterworks and Irrigation 
Company, supra. 
2. The record supports an express contract between plaintiffs 
and defendant, McDermond. All of plaintiff's, Buehner Block, 
material was ordered by McDermond (R. 84-86). The great 
bulk of plaintiff's, South State Builders, material was ordered 
by defendant, Mc;Dermond (Ex. 3). It is an established prin-
ciple of evidence that one's admissions or declarations against 
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his own proprietary interests are admissible against him while 
his own self-serving declarations are not admissible in his favor. 
See 20 Am. fur., Evidence, Sec. 544, p. 460. Accordingly, the fact 
that a certain person was a member of a partnership, and there-
fore liable for the firm debts at a specified time may be proved 
by his admissions that he was a partner. Herman Kahn Com-
pany v. Bowden, 80 Ark. 23, 96 S.W. 126; Payette Lumber Co. v. 
Sarret, 38 Idaho 278, 221 Pac. 130; Dawson v. Pogue, 18 
Ore. 94, 22 Pac. 637; Hobbs v. Virginia National Bank, 147 
Va. 802, 28 S.E. 46; Annotation 20 L.R.A. 495; Smith v. Butt 
and Harden, 281 Ky. 127, 135 S.W. 2d 67, 157 A.L.R. 648. In 
addition, it is well established that the existence of a partner-
ship may be implied from circumstances, acts and conduct. 
Bridgeman v. Winsness, 34 Utah 383, 98 Pac. 186. The record 
is replete with acts and conduct on the part of defendant, 
Hong, leading inescapably to the conclusion of a partnership 
with the builder, McDermond. 
3. Defendant, McDermond, is liable to plaintiffs in con-
tract implied in fact. A contract implied in fact arises where 
the intention of the parties is not expressed, but an agreement 
in fact is implied or presumed from their acts, according to 
the ordinary course of dealings and the common understanding 
of n1en. 17 C.J.S. 318, Contl'acts, Sec. 46. An implied contract 
is one where the mutual intent is manifested by particular acts 
and attendant circumstances. Gleason r. Salt Lake City, 94 
Utah 1, 74 P.2d 1225. 
"Neither a ,,·ritten offer and acceptance nor oral 
l'ounterparts are essential to establish a contractural 
rl'lationship, for unatnbiguous conduct of one party 
h)\vards the other, under such circumstances, as clearly 
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to manifest an intention that one party perform and 
that the other party compensate for such performance, 
is sufficient." 
Kimball Elevator Co.} Inc. v. Elevator Supplies Co.} Inc., 2 
U.2d 289, 272 P.2d 583; McCollum v. Clothier} 121 Utah 311, 
241 P.2d 468. We have no argument with appellant's cases 
cited for the proposition that there can be no implied contract 
where an express contract exists between the same parties, but 
contend there is no conflict between the express and implied 
contracts herein. 
4. The theory that the builder, McDermond, is liable in 
contract implied in law, and hence his partner, Harry Hong, 
is also liable, is amply supported by the evidence (as shown 
at the beginning of this argument). The materials were fur-
nished with the knowledge, consent and approval of Mc-
Dermond (Ex. 1 & 3, R. 50, 51, 52, 84-86. McDermond 
was obviously enriched by the addition to the premises which 
he was operating for profit (R. 63, 64). The authorities sup-
porting a conclusion of law of unjust enrichment under these 
findings are amply discussed in Point I (c) above. 
5. By the same token, there is substantial evidence within 
the record (as shown at the beginning of this argument) to 
support the conclusion of liability upon defendant, Hong, by 
reason of his own unjust enrichment, irrespective of any part-
nership with the builder, McDermond. Plaintiffs are not 
officious intermeddlers. They furnished materials for the im-
provement of Hong's premises with the knowledge, consent 
and approval of Hong who stands by in silence and sees work 
done in the improvement of his premises and accepts the 
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benefits thereto. A promise to pay therefor may be implied 
in law. See 17 C.J.S. 321, supra. 
POINT III. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMITTED BY THE 
COURT IN THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL. 
An examination of the record will show that the plaintiffs' 
case in chief was presented, and plaintiff rested (R. 86). At 
this time. Mr. Clyde, the attorney for the defendant Glezos, 
presented a mention to dismiss the action against the defendant, 
Glezos, and argument with the court was had on this motion. 
During this argument the court said, ctNow as to this other 
phase of it, Mr. Ashworth, this Mr. Watson lends some doubt 
about the matter as to Mr. Hong" (R. 88). Mr. Ashworth 
then commenced arguing the case in favor of Mr. Hong. At 
no time did Mr. Ashworth object to the court's failing to 
permit him to put on any evidence nor did Mr. Ashworth 
offer to introduce any \Yitnesses or documents. It is true that 
during the argument between Mr. Ashworth and Mr. Conder 
and the Court about the position of Mr. Hong, Mr. Watson 
stood up in the back of the courtroom and the Court stated, 
nMr. Watson, do you \vant to say something?" Mr. Watson 
ans\\·ered, nYes." The Court. HJust come in here" (R. 88). 
It should be noted that Mr. \\r atson testified for the plaintiff 
in the plaintiffs· case in chief, and had been previously sworn 
and testified ~ts a \\'itness for the plaintiffs. It \vas after the 
direct cx;unination and cross-exatnination of l\fr. \\ratson, and 
during the argulnent of counsel in connection \vith the tnotion 
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to dismiss by Mr. Grezos, that Mr. Watson indicated to the 
Court that he had something further to say (R. 88). Any 
statements made by Mr. Watson as to what Mr. McDermond 
had said were of course heresay and objected to by Mr. Ash-
worth, and at no time have the plaintiffs made any claim for 
the statements, since there is substantial competent testimony 
as to the existence of the partnership in the conversations and 
statements made by Mr. Hong to Mr. Watson and others. Mr. 
Ashworth was given ample opportunity by the court to present 
his case as he desired, the court stating, ((Do you desire to 
put more testimony on Mr. Ashworth?" (R. 93). Mr. Ash-
worth then called Mr. Harry Hong to the stand to testify in 
his own behalf, even though he had been previously sworn 
and examined by his counsel. Mr. Ashworth then asked Mr. 
Hong several questions on direct examination, including tes-
timony as to the existence or non-existence of a partnership 
(R. 93-94), and cross-examination and redirect examinatiov. 
were all had of Mr. Hong. Thus, the court, never, at any time! 
interferred with Mr. Ashworth's proper presentation of his 
case, and likewise Mr. Ashworth never raised an objection 
that he was not being given, or had not been given an ample 
opportunity to put on any testimony that he desired in con-
nection with this case. The power of the court to examine wit-
nesses is summarized as follows: 
((E~amination by Court or Jury.-A trial judge has 
the nght to propound such questions to witnesses as 
may be necessary to elicit pertinent facts, in order that 
the truth may be established, although some reviewing 
courts have declared that the practice of so doing 
except ~hen absolu~ely necessary should be discouragec_r 
Accordtngly, the tnal court has power to recall a wit-
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ness who has been examined, or ask him leading ques-
tions, and he may elicit any relevant and material evi-
dence, without regard to its effect, whether beneficial 
or prejudical to one party or the other. Indeed, it has 
been declared to be the duty of the court to propound 
such questions to reluctant witnesses as will strip them 
of the subterfuges to which they resort to evade telling 
the truth. The extent to which such examination shall 
be conducted rests in the direction of the judge, the 
exercise of which will not be controlled unless abused." 
58 Anz. fur., Witnesses, Sec. 557, p. 310. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT HONG'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant Hong's motion for a new trial alleged the 
following grounds: 
1. Insufficient evidence to justify the judgment; 
2. Surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guard-
ed against; 
3. New 1 y discovered evidence; and 
4. Error in law. 
His brief, however, does not argue the insufficiency of the 
evidence, and claims a new ground (for the first tin1e) of mis-
conduct of the trial judge. We feel it unnecessary to further 
discuss the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgn1ent, 
and only con1ment briefly that the trial \vas conducted fairly 
and itnpartially in all particulars, and that the trial judge \vas 
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guilty of no misconduct which entitled defendant, Hong, to a 
new trial. 
With respect to surprise, defendant's claim is that plaintiffs' 
failure to plead partnership liability surprised him, and he 
could not guard against it. It is interesting to note that nowhere 
in the record does defendant object to the introduction of any 
testimony regarding partnership, and in fact, does present 
evidence himself regarding this issue (R. 93-94). It is elemen-
tary that this is not such surprise as is contemplated by the rule 
as grounds for new trial. Flanders v. Hunter, 60 Utah 314, 
208 Pac. 526; Steward Mining Co. v. Coulter, 3 Utah 174, 5 
Pac. 557, and that issues tried by express or implied consent 
shall be treated, in all respects, as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings. Rule 15 (b) U.R.C.P. 
With respect to alleged newly discovered evidence, defend-
ant supported his motion with affidavits of defendant, Hong, 
and his counsel (R. 102, 103, 104 and 105). The substance 
of said affidavits is that ((Plaintiff's witnesses * * * perjured 
themselves and that defendant has discovered new evidence 
* * * being bank records and statements * * * and also copy 
of federal income tax * * * which could not be produced at 
the trial." Though it is difficult to see how such evidence 
would show the absence of partnership or the absence of pay-
ment by defendant to witness Kinser, it is obvious that under 
any circumstances such evidence would be merely cumulative 
or tending to impeach adverse witnesses. It is well established 
that such ((newly discovered evidence" is not the evidence 
contetnplated by the rule governing new trials. Klopenstine tJ. 
1-layes, 20 Utah 45, 57 Pac. 712; Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 
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347, 57 P.2d 708; Sowder v. W ardy Oil Corp., 231 F.2d 9 
(CCA lOth). 
The only error in law defendant alleges the trial judge 
committed is that the court found that defendant, Hong, agreed 
to pay the debts of another without having done so in writing, 
in violation of the Statute of Frauds. Of course, there is no 
such objection in the record to any of the testimony, but it is 
elementary partnership law that a partnership debt, and the 
resulting liability of the individual partners, is not the debt of 
another, but rather by the very terms of the Uniform Partner-
ship Act, a debt of such individual partner, U.C.A. 48-1-12, 
( 1953). In addition, as set forth in Point II above, the evidence 
adequately supports findings of liability on the basis of implied 
contract, which, of course, is outside the scope of the Statute 
of Frauds. 
Despite the above, it is well established in this jurisdiction 
that with respect to a trial court's failure to grant or deny a 
motion for new trial, only an abuse of discretion will be ex-
amined by this court. See Ct·elin z:. T hotnas, .: ___ Utah 2d ____ , 
247 P.2d 264. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents submit that the trial below was conducted 
fairly and without error, and that the judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DEAN E. CONDER 
DELBERT ~1. DRAPER, JR. 
Attonzeys fo,- Respondents 
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